

緊急特集:BISがついに抜け穴を塞ぐ? 次に習近平はどう動くか
ChinaTalk
要約
米商務省BISが132ページの新たな輸出管理規則を公表した。元バイデン政権NSCのChris McGuire氏とJulian Gewirtz氏が、東南アジア・ブラジル向けライセンス要件、中国企業へのクラウド計算資源貸与の上限、TSMCの抜け穴封じという3本柱を解説する。米国内の貸与が対象外という大きな穴、Trump氏が中国訪問で踏みとどまれるか、NvidiaのJensen Huang氏の動機、執行と企業責任の欠如についても議論している。
この回のポイント
- ●規則は、AIチップの密輸対策、中国企業への計算資源貸与の制限、中国企業のTSMC等での製造の抜け穴封じの3分野を扱う。McGuire氏は「実質的な前進」と評価しつつ不完全だと述べる。
- ●貸与の上限は最先端のBlackwell級チップ約200個、H100換算で約800個相当。遡及適用とされ、Megaspeedなどへの執行の根拠になり得るという。
- ●米国内は対象外で、中国企業の計算需要がジョホールから北バージニアへ移る恐れがある。McGuire氏は商務省の権限で塞げるとして、早期の追加措置を求めた。
- ●Gewirtz氏は、習近平氏が数字を把握しているかが鍵だと指摘する。北京は昨年のAI拡散規則の時と同様、Trump氏との首脳関係で規制緩和を狙うとの見立てを示した。
- ●Jensen Huang氏の動機として、顧客集中への懸念やイデオロギー的な国際技術観が挙がった。McGuire氏は、それはNvidia自身の問題であり、より良いチップを作ることで対処すべきだと述べる。
- ●BNP Paribasの巨額罰金のように、チップ分野でも企業に責任を取らせる執行が必要だと論じる。Gewirtz氏はAI安全の説明責任にも通じる問題だとした。
章立て
新規則の全体像と3つの柱
McGuire氏が規則の概要を説明する。密輸対策、計算資源貸与の制限、TSMCの抜け穴封じの3分野で、不完全ながら前進だと評価した。
密輸対策:5カ国へのライセンス要件
シンガポール、マレーシア、タイ、インドネシア、ブラジルが対象となる。密輸が他国へ移る可能性や、世界規模での可視性確保の必要性にも触れた。
クラウド貸与の上限と米国内の抜け穴
貸与の上限や遡及適用、Megaspeedへの影響を論じる。米国内が対象外のため北バージニアが中国AIの拠点になりかねないと警告した。
規則の作成過程とBISの信頼性
商務省の発表がTreasuryとNSCの関与に言及した点を巡り、同省の信頼性の低さを議論する。Trump氏が踏みとどまれるかも論点になった。
中国のAI業界への影響と米企業の需要
中国の計算資源の約5分の2が遠隔アクセスだという推計を踏まえ、米AI企業には十分な需要があると論じる。レコメンドアルゴリズムの例外条項の懸念も出た。
習近平氏の反応とTrump氏の中国訪問
習氏が数字を把握しているか、北京が報復するか緩和を狙うかを議論する。政権高官の発言や中国国内の企業と政府の利害の違いにも触れた。
Jensenの動機:スープ屋の逸話
顧客集中への不安から、NvidiaがアジアのネオクラウドやAIの中国市場に向かった可能性を論じる。品質で勝つべきだという批判も出た。
執行と企業の説明責任、AI安全
銀行制裁の事例を引き、チップ分野でも巨額罰金が必要だと論じる。三百万個のチップが製造された問題やAI安全への波及も語られた。
解説記事
米商務省産業安全保障局(BIS)が、132ページに及ぶ新たな輸出管理規則を発表した。ChinaTalkの緊急回では、元バイデン政権NSCのChris McGuire氏(外交問題評議会)とJulian Gewirtz氏(コロンビア大SIPA)が、規則の中身と米中関係への影響を議論した。McGuire氏は、ここ約18カ月で初めて、AIと輸出管理の重要性を認める兆しが見えたと評価している。
規則の3本柱
McGuire氏によれば、規則は3分野を扱う。1つ目は中国によるAIチップの密輸対策で、シンガポール、マレーシア、タイ、インドネシア、ブラジルが新たにライセンス要件の対象となる。経済規模に比べてAIチップの輸入が突出して多い国々で、同氏は、これまで中国向けだった需要がこれらの国に移っていたと述べる。ただし、密輸網がブータンやネパールなどへ移る可能性があるため、世界のどこであれ数億ドル規模のチップ購入を米政府が把握できる枠組みが必要だと主張した。
2つ目は、中国企業へのAIチップの貸与(リモートアクセス)の制限だ。ライセンスなしで貸せるのは最先端のBlackwell級で約200個、H100換算で約800個相当に限られる。最先端モデルの訓練や運用には数千〜数十万個が要るため、大きな制約になるという。規則は遡及的に適用され、計算能力の半分以上を中国企業に提供していた事業者は従来から違反だったと位置づけられる。これにより、MegaspeedのようなケースでBISが責任を問える余地が生まれるとMcGuire氏は見る。
3つ目は、中国企業がTSMCやSamsungでAIチップを製造する抜け穴の封鎖である。バイデン政権が導入した許可制はトランプ政権下で執行されていなかったが、今回復活した。さらに14nm以下の先端チップを製造する中国企業は、AI用かどうかを問わずライセンスが必要になる。たとえばXiaomiがTSMCで3nmのスマートフォン向けチップを作る場合も対象で、影響はAIにとどまらないとされる。
残された大きな穴:米国内
McGuire氏が最大の抜け穴として挙げるのが、貸与の制限が米国内には適用されない点だ。このままでは、中国企業が計算需要をマレーシアのジョホールから北バージニアに移し、同地が中国AIの中心になりかねないという。商務省には現行の権限で塞げるため、追い規則を早期に出すべきだと述べた。
ホストのJordan氏が触れたChinaTalkの推計では、中国の総計算能力の約5分の2がリモートアクセスだという。McGuire氏は、米AI企業はどこも「チップが足りない」と公言しており、すでに複数のAIラボから対処方法を尋ねる連絡を受けたと語った。輸出管理でNvidiaの販売が1件も減っていないという主張も繰り返している。また、Megaspeedのような介在形態では米政府はクラウドを止める手段も利益も得られず、「クラウドを温存すべき」という議論は現状に当てはまらないと述べた。レコメンドアルゴリズムの例外条項が、抜け穴として広く解釈される懸念も示した。
誰が書いたのか、そして習近平はどう動くか
商務省の発表文が、規則をTreasuryとNSCが作成したと記している点も話題になった。Gewirtz氏は、NSCが商務省の規則作成を助けること自体は前例があるとしつつ、商務省の信頼性が低いと政権自身が認識している表れだとの見方を示した。McGuire氏も、実施と執行を担うのは商務省であり、同省が本気でなければ密輸は止まらないと述べ、現在の指導部に効果的な実施が可能か確信がないと語った。
Gewirtz氏は、北京の反応は、習近平氏が中国AI企業のNvidiaチップ依存の実態を把握しているかに左右されると指摘する。基本シナリオは、昨年のAI拡散規則のときと同じく、トランプ氏との首脳関係を通じた規制緩和への賭けだという。規則はライセンス制であり行政側の裁量が大きいため、北京は報復よりも実施段階での骨抜きを狙う可能性があるとも述べた。McGuire氏は、政権高官が事前の説明で「中国は密輸も遠隔利用もしていないと言っているのだから、懸念する理由はない」と述べ、輸出管理は交渉対象でないと明言した点を評価した。一方、トランプ氏本人の姿勢には不安が残るという。中国側にも、ハードウェア企業が優遇され、ソフトウェア・AIモデル企業が劣位に置かれやすいという政治経済的な事情があり、政府と企業の利害は一致しないかもしれないという分析も出た。
Jensenの動機と企業の説明責任
McGuire氏は、Wall Street Journalが報じたJensen Huang氏のスープ屋の逸話を紹介した。1〜2の客に在庫を売り切らず、価格を高く保ち顧客層を分散させる店主こそ優れた経営者だという話だ。McGuire氏は、ここに顧客集中への懸念がうかがえるとし、年に千億ドル規模でチップを買える企業は限られるため、分散先を探すと中国が残ることになると分析した。だが、それはNvidia自身の問題であり、解決策は最高のチップを作り続けることだと述べた。Gewirtz氏は、世界中が米企業を必要とするというイデオロギー的な国際技術観も背景にあるとし、北京が望むのは自立を掲げつつ米技術の恩恵も得る二重路線だと述べた。
両氏は、本質は密輸への企業と政府の対応にあるとする。Gewirtz氏は、2000年代にStandard CharteredやWells Fargoなどの銀行が制裁法を軽視し、BNP Paribasへの約90億ドルの罰金でようやく文化が変わったと例える。チップ分野では大型の罰金がなく、Applied Materialsへの5億ドルの罰金も規模としては小さいという。McGuire氏は、HuaweiがTSMCで約300万個のAIチップを製造できた問題が、1個1.5万ドルで換算すれば約500億ドルに相当するのに、結果がなかったと指摘した。Gewirtz氏は、この説明責任の欠如はAI安全の問題にもつながり、より広いAIエコシステムのガバナンスにもつながるべきだと述べた。
まとめ
今回の規則は、クラウド経由の計算資源提供と製造委託という、これまで見過ごされてきた経路に踏み込んだ点で重要だ。ただし米国内の貸与が対象外のままでは実効性が限られ、商務省の執行姿勢とトランプ氏の対中交渉が成否を左右する。日本の読者にとっては、計算資源の需給、クラウド事業者の規制対応、そしてサプライチェーン企業に求められるコンプライアンスの水準が変わりうる動きとして、続報を注視する価値がある。
文字起こし(英語・自動生成)
And it's Monday. We have to do another one. Oh, my God. Chris McGuire joins Julian Gewirtz. We have a new BIS rule. Cloud loophole closed. Question mark. Chris, how are you doing? Okay, I think. A little overwhelmed. But, hey, like, this is, like, progress. First time in, like, 18 months that I think we've seen signs of life and actual recognition that AI and export controls matter. So not perfect, but good. Let's start with what's in the rule. Then we'll do a little meta how this rule got made. And then we're going to bring in Julian to talk about what this could potentially mean for U.S.-China relations. Chris, 132 pages. Pangram says it's all human-ridden, no AI generation. What's in the rule? Yeah. So, and it's important to know, look, the details here are the story, right? I think there's a lot of fixation that we've had on, you know, these affairs or, like, who wrote the rule or something.
This is a huge rule. It's going to impact hundreds of billions of dollars of capital flows and really impacts kind of how the AI industry functions. So, understanding it is this is the biggest part of the story, not who slept with who or kind of any of this trivial drama I think people are looking about. So, I'd say really there's three categories of things that it addresses. The first is countering Chinese smuggling of AI chips. The second thing is restricting Chinese companies from renting access to AI chips. And then the third is closing loopholes that prevent Chinese companies from making AI chips at TSMC or Samsung or other places. So there's three ways it tries to kind of cut down China's access to compute. I think my top line is, like I said at the start, this is a good rule that actually does move the ball forward. It closes multiple real loopholes. That's positive. It is also imperfect. There are some, you know, specific things I think need to be closed where, you know, you close some loopholes and it makes others more important. So I think we need to take a few additional actions to tighten things up that we can talk about.
But, like, this is actual forward progress. Okay, so breaking down those three buckets. The first bucket is countering Chinese smuggling of AI chips. Pretty straightforward here. It imposes controls on Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, and Brazil. Southeast Asia in particular has just become a massive smuggling hub for AI chips in the last few years. Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia were the numbers 3, 4, 5, and 8 importer of AI chips in the world relative to the size of their economies and size of GDP. It's just way, way, way more than anyone else. So obviously this is a significant issue. They basically displaced China. All the demand that was previously going to China is going to these countries. And then Brazil is also setting up pretty large AI data centers for ByteDance and others. and that's known, so I guess that's why they got at it as well. This is good. This is positive. It will push smuggling to other countries, right? Like, if you don't have something that's broad, then inevitably the smugglers will move from Malaysia to, I don't know, Bhutan or Nepal or somewhere else. This is important to keep in mind. But the countries that are the biggest hubs of this right now
now have to go to the U.S. government to get a license before their companies can buy the chips. I do think that what we need to move toward is this general policy of, hey, if you're buying like hundreds of millions of dollars of AI chips anywhere in the world, the U.S. government has to at least have visibility on that, if not, you know, the ability to veto. But that's something I think can be can be done, can and should be done in a follow up. But this is actually forward progress. The second thing is restricting Chinese companies from renting access to AI chips. And this is actually a pretty notable development that is has not been in effect on the smuggling issues. The Trump administration had not been enforcing regulations, anti-smuggling regulations that the Biden administration put into effect. But on this, there actually had not been regulations like this. So this is new and it's positive. They're basically saying if you have large numbers of AI chips, you can only rent a pretty small number to Chinese companies and have it without applying for a license from the Department of Commerce.
It's the equivalent of about 200 of the most advanced black belt chips or about 800 H100 chips. So, you know, that's obviously a significant number of chips. But also when you're talking about training or running the most advanced AI models, you're talking about thousands, tens of thousands, maybe even hundreds of thousands of chips. So this would be a significant curtailment on China's access to the chips. It applies also retroactively. So what it does is it says this has actually always been the policy that if you were providing at least half of your computing power to Chinese companies, then that itself was a violation of controls. And, you know, that that is a significant sign that if that actually is enforced, it would mean that they could go after Megaspeed and say that you actually were violating controls by providing that compute to China. You know, we'll see how enforcement goes on all this. But generally, it's a very strong signal that they don't want this to happen. I'd say one huge, huge loophole on this, though, is that it doesn't apply inside the United States.
And until that's closed, what's going to happen is you're just going to get all the Chinese companies. They're going to divert all their computing power away from Johor, Malaysia, and to Northern Virginia. Northern Virginia is going to become the center of China AI until we fix this. So this does need to happen, and actually this can happen within authorities. Commerce has the authority to do this right now, but that needs to get done. Last thing I'd say is the blocking Chinese chip designers from making AI chips at TSMC. This is good and important. The Biden administration had put into effect regulations that would basically make sure for any company making an AI chip in the world, they would have to come in at TSMC, they'd have to come in for a license unless they were on like a white list of companies. There's not that many companies that are making these chips, so all these companies are already on the white list. That had not been in effect for various arcane regulatory reasons, but commerce had not been enforcing it. Now it goes back into effect. They will enforce it. That's good. They actually went a step further, and they said any Chinese company who's making any 14-nanometer or more advanced chip has to apply for a license, no matter what.
No matter what they say, whether it's an AI chip or not, and there's some technical parameters on that, they have to come in for a license. So what that means, actually, is that Xiaomi has to apply for a license to make a three-nanometer smartphone chip at TSMC. So actually, there's some implications of this that are bigger than AI. I mean, this is great for Qualcomm or others or companies that would like to sell some of their smartphone chips to China, but actually China is designing their own chips at TSMC. Now U.S. companies might get more of that market. But I think the purpose here isn't necessarily to capture and prevent and, you know, give them an advantage. The purpose is to cut down on Chinese smuggling and really cut off all the avenues, because we know that China has made millions of chips at TSMC illicitly. So those are the three categories of things. Like I said, top line, very positive step forward, important work left to be done, especially as it relates to activities inside the United States that little loopholes need to be closed tomorrow. but this is actually signs of life and a recognition that export controls is something that we're going to do
and U.S. advantages in computing power actually matter. Wow. Okay. It's finally here. I mean, we've got to do Powell's entry just for a little bit before we go down the kind of like broader implications of it. I mean, you don't write a 132-page rule over a long weekend. Like, this was clearly kicked around for a long time. We had this crazy line in the press release where it said, like, this was authored by Treasury and the NSC. I mean, this is Commerce's job. I asked ChatGPT for analogies. It went back to Soviet gas pipeline stations from 1982 with NSC, the National Security Advisor Clark, fighting with Alexander Haig. So, like, it's been a bit since it's gotten this messy in public. You know, like, does this happen? If the spy news doesn't end up getting out and Jensen leaves, I read is that there was just, like, enough pent-up demand for this within the administration that, like, these two things are not unconnected.
The fact that, you know, whoever it was that pushed these journalists, you know, helped give the journalists the breadcrumbs to write this story happened at the same time as they had a reg which was not moving in commerce. All right. So let's or Julian, I don't know any any any palace entry observations before we get into the into the role. It is so striking to see that kind of language in the commerce press release, not because this is the first time in history that the NSC has helped draft a commerce regulation. I'll sort of refrain from comment when I'm here with my former colleague from NSC days. but because it actually, to me, signals one thing more than anything else, which is that the administration knows that commerce is low on credibility in Washington and more generally. And so while we may see it as the palace intrigue of the drafting, to me it is also about the credibility of the signal. It's an attempt to say this is a regulation that can stand up and that we should expect to last.
My own concern is that President Trump this morning when he was talking about some of these dynamics Took it back to the palace entry took it back to Lutnik and Besson disagreeing on how to approach China policy and seemed pretty unaware that his administration had just rolled out this major new regulation And I say all of that because, of course, the president is heading to China, where he is about to confront a set of people across the negotiating table who do not want these regulations on the books. And we can talk about that more. But I do very much think that there is a version of events where we hold fast to this, but there's a version of events where he gets wobbly pretty quick. Yeah, look, commerce has to implement these controls, right? Like you could write them however you want, whoever you want can write them, but ultimately commerce has to implement them and enforce them. And if that isn't going to be taken seriously, and if commerce isn't actually bought in on this, and if enforcement goes the way that it has to date, then it's not going to matter what's on the books, right? We're still going to see the same rampant smuggling, and it's not going to be deterred. So we do need to see a change in attitude and perspective on commerce if this is going to be effective at all.
And, yeah, I'm not convinced that current leadership can actually effectuate this. All right. So back to the chip balance of power. At China Talk, Nick and Ake back in April kind of did their best guess breakdown of how many chips in the ratios between domestic, smuggled, legal, foreign and remote access. And, you know, looking at the chart, it's like two fifths of China's total compute is remote access. So if this gets cut down or even if they just have to or even if they don't close your America loophole and they have to start bidding against, you know, the most oversubscribed data centers on the planet in America. I mean, we're talking like a significant hit to the broader Chinese ecosystem when it comes to training and inference. I mean, you know, Chris, I was doing the podcast with Dylan on Friday. We were talking about remote access, and we were like, you know, maybe they'll do it, but maybe they'll say, you know, anything forward from today.
Like, you have to titrate it or, like, you know, you've got to ratchet down over the next three to six months. I mean, this ostensibly is 90 days and you can't service Chinese clients doing anything besides, you know, telling you what your friends like to buy and offering you to buy, you know, offering you like mountain bikes and and and short video recommendations. I mean, let's stay on that for a second. Like these guys, they all have to find American clients. I mean, are open eye and anthropic just like salivating at the mouth that they can get all this compute in Malaysia on the cheap? I mean, I think they should be. I mean, I think there's big questions of, like, how can the AI ecosystem absorb this if actually so much of it has been illicitly been being sent to China through these kind of remote access schemes, or maybe not illicitly, but circumventing controls, exploiting this loophole. You know, is there enough demand to actually absorb that? But keep in mind, like you said, every single AI company is publicly saying, we want to get more chips and we can't get them. Andy Jassy is out there saying that. Elon Musk is out there saying that.
I've had multiple AI labs contact me this morning to say, hey, do you know who is most impacted by this so we can call them and get access to the compute? Like, there is so much demand for this. So this is why it's all the more perplexing that the U.S. has pursued this policy that's actually allowed this compute to flow to these entities that are flowing to China when actually, like, there's demand for it here. Export controls, I say it multiple times. I'll say it again. Export controls have not negatively impacted one NVIDIA sale so far. They have sold every single chip that they have made since the export controls went into effect because there's so much demand for them. And that's good. And it actually makes this, you know, more reasonable and effective. One thing I would note, so you saw the comments that Dylan and others have made on this. And, you know, there's there's also this debate about, well, do you want to preserve the ability to shut the Chinese off on on cloud access? But keep in mind, that's actually not where we are right now. You know, it's not like they have had they've been accessing cloud just through AWS or Microsoft and all that money is flowing to American companies. And we have the lever. They're just getting it all through Megaspeed.
And like Megaspeed doesn't give the U.S. government any ability to actually cut the Chinese off. And it doesn't give us any of the profits. It's just a straight up shell company that they're using to basically buy chips themselves in a way that is is legal. So the structure and how it was actually didn't really make any sense for any kind of way that you craft the argument on cloud. And, yeah, look, I think there's big questions about, like, are we actually going to be able to make sure that Megaspeed doesn't serve any Chinese customers? I'm not really sure. It's going to be really hard to verify this. But what the regulation says is if they do, it's illegal, and we will hold them to account for it. So at the very least, it's a very strong signaling of intent. I think that will create a pretty strong chilling effect for companies. And then obviously going forward, I think this is very clear kind of what the U.S. government's expectations are. Now, with the caveat that we'll see how it's actually enforced. There's also a carve out here for recommendation algorithms that seems like the TikTok carve out that like, you know, does that is that broadly implemented in a way that actually, you know, is a loophole that you can drive a Mack truck through?
Like that would be a big issue. But if it's, you know, in a narrow way, then it might be it might be it might be more OK. I mean, it does come back to the like, why was Jensen letting this happen in the first place stuff? And, you know, even if it's not because, you know, he was doing this before he had Alice Wong as a girlfriend. Right. And so, you know, is it was it juicing a man because you're not allowed to sell chips? Is it just this this kind of like globalist vision that he still wants everyone to be on it? Is he really worried about the coup de mode? You know, like the sort of the puzzle from the beginning is like if there was enough demand there from the beginning, why deal? Why expose yourself to all of this? You know, what ended up happening over the past few weeks when the, you know, American national security state ended up biting back. So it's still kind of a puzzle to me. I mean, maybe it was just this kind of like long-term demand play.
Maybe the chips weren't actually wanted. I don't know. Julian and Chris, what are your best theories for why Jensen pumped this? I mean, there are a bunch of different theories that I think are actually all mutually compatible. One is just a kind of core long-term business theory, as you alluded to, that like even if now the dynamic that Chris describes is true, that over the long term, you know, you want to be serving what is clearly a major AI ecosystem. But I can't kind of get out of my head the fact that there's a strong sort of ideological dimension to this, too, which is a vision of what an international technology ecosystem, air quotes, ought to look like. And it's one in which the world leading U.S. companies are needed by everybody. And to my mind, you know, for years, I felt like that is just out of step with where Beijing sees the future going. And that, in fact, Beijing's ideal version of this transitional period is one in which it gets to assert publicly that it is pursuing self-reliance and making breakthrough after breakthrough on the basis of an indigenous tech stack.
But in fact, through third country remote access and through smuggling and all the other dynamics Chris has been describing, getting the advantage of that world leading American technology. And that kind of two track model is not designed to last. It's designed to be something Beijing outgrows as quickly as it can. But they're not there yet. Well, let's talk maybe now about the response function. Right. I mean, there's this there's this open question. Like, you can do a calculation on just how many, you know, months or years implementing the Match Act would get you, just how many months or years of kind of, like, AI to lead, closing this remote access loophole, or cracking down on TSMC fabbing chips would get you. But there's, you know, this looming rare earths thing. There's looming dependency on packaging, on optics that we talked about with Dylan on Friday. and I'll start with Julian. Like how do you think Xi is going to take this if it doesn't just disappear in a week,
but it seems like the U.S. is really actually going to stick to this rule and start to implement it in a serious way? Well, I'm very interested in how Chris thinks about this too, but my own reaction is that a lot of this turns on one basic question that we do not have an answer to, which is, does Xi Jinping know the numbers, Jordan, that you quoted earlier about how much Chinese AI companies are reliant on this, you know, these chips from NVIDIA and from abroad? Because I can certainly imagine a version of events in which he is, and I can imagine a version of events in which he is not. And it may be that the past week, this crazy saga that has burst into view is one of the first times that his lieutenants have to go up and say, boss, there is some stuff you need to know about. And we're learning about it from the labs or we've, you know, didn't realize it was as big. And so we don't know that, but if he is aware of the stakes of how significant this could be for reigning back in China's AI progress,
then I do think it points toward a more escalatory tit But my base case at the moment is basically that the timing of this you know you said Jordan is obviously partly driven by the revelations about Megaspeed and NVIDIA But I also think the Trump administration thinks they can put this out right before Trump goes to China and they can use that diplomacy to manage the fallout. And Beijing's approach, as we know, is likely to be to explore what they can get done, maybe to threaten retaliation, maybe to try to negotiate exemptions or weakening, but at a minimum to run the playbook that they ran last year in response to the AI diffusion rule from the Biden administration, which is to bet on Trump, to bet that they can use the leader level relationship to loosen the regime. And so the question, as we see these meetings unfold in Shenzhen, is how personally bought into this regime is Trump? How much do his advisors constrain what might be his impulse to make deals?
How much does the political blowback in the United States constrain that? Because if, in fact, they're able to, as I hope they do, stick the line, then there may be a window in which Beijing only slowly comes to realize the importance of this policy, and that could pare back the degree of retaliation we get. So maybe the actual reading of Trump's comments at the helicopter today was was more like, you know, when something happens and it's kind of embarrassing and he just like pretends it never has happened. He's like, oh, yeah, that thing. I never heard of it. I don't know what you're talking about. He'll do the same. And what is that same line as Xi Jinping? Yeah. And Jordan, I'll just make one other point. Because this is a licensing regime, it there's a lot of discretion, as Chris was saying earlier, that the executive branch retains. And so Beijing would not be wrong to think that rather than escalating in retaliation, it should work to blunt the impact in implementation. So I agree completely that I think a lot is going to hinge on these conversations and how much we actually stick to this and how much of this is pushed by various people in the administration.
As the president kind of committed to it. But I will say, you've got to get credit where credit's due. There was some very good messaging from a senior administration official on background in advance of the China trip in a press call that was publicly reported. And they were asked, well, you know, there's conversations about closing some loopholes and export controls. Like, how does that factor into the China trip? And what the official said was, well, we don't really see these things as connected because, first of all, any license requirements on, you know, Malaysia or other countries to counter smuggling. I mean, the Chinese are telling us that they're not smuggling chips, so why should they care? And also, the Chinese are telling us that they're not massively remotely accessing chips, so again, why should they care? And if they really cared about this and they were so concerned about it, they wouldn't be letting the hundreds of thousands of H-200s be sitting in the port in Hong Kong, that they're not actually allowing in. So kind of saying, like, the way the Chinese are acting is that, like, you know, this isn't actually something that they're that concerned about, and if they are concerned about it, they could let those chips through, But it doesn't really make sense for them to complain about this.
Now, of course, the reason that they're, you know, there's all the disconnects in their system. And obviously, they're trying to get the administration to kind of approve Blackwell chips, which are what they're getting here. And, you know, that's one of many reasons why they're not letting the H200s through. But that is very, very smart and astute messaging, I think, from the administration on trying to tamp it down. And they explicitly said, like, we don't negotiate on X-bar controls. Now, you can say that in a separate question if it actually happens. But at least the messaging is right. So I think, yeah, the question is, like, do you actually see the leadership stick to this at the high level? And I just want to reiterate, like, we can be applauding all this, but, like, we do have to finish the job, right? Like, especially the loopholes as it relates to activity in the United States, until those are closed, this won't really work. I really appreciate the effort to kind of crack down on remote access compute. But as long as China can just legally access it in the U.S., like, this whole idea, it won't be fully implemented. Now, this is a hard thing, and, like, you know, we do follow-up rules.
We did that before. Like, let's give them some grace, and they can do that in the coming, you know, month or two or whatever. But we should see that. For this to have an effect, we do have to see that right away. Yeah, I mean, I think Julian's take on, like, she needs to be the one to harmonize this as a policy. because it has been so messy of the like, will we or won't we? What do we want? What don't we want? I mean, clearly there's like people of many different minds at very senior levels in the Chinese system, such that we have so many like weird anomalies as those those trips that are stuck in Hong Kong. Yeah. And go ahead. I have a separate thing. All I was going to say was it's just also really important to remember that this is an area where the incentives of Chinese, AI model companies and the Chinese government may be quite different. You know, so one of the things that I think we have not understood about the kind of political economy of this on the Chinese side is how much of this remote access type activity is
driven by the companies with the government just looking away and how much is directed by the government, you know, or fully sort of a joint initiative here. And my own hunch has been that a large amount of it has been the companies themselves finding compute following what they perceive to be the letter of the law in some cases and in other cases, you know, as the Leon Wenfeng, the deep sea founder said in his investor call, you know, getting access to some unlicensed cards, some unlicensed chips. So, you know, there's a mix here. And as you say, Jordan, if this is the moment when that all starts to really get rectified on the Chinese side, it could actually amplify the slowdown effect on China's AI progress from just the restriction on compute that's happening. Because, I mean, from the beginning, right, like, who are the darling, who are the political economy darlings in China? Chip makers, hardware providers, who are the ugly stepchildren? It's software broadly defined, and that's Tencent. That's Alibaba. That's these, like, new companies that have just, like,
shown up over the past two or three years. And so for them to, like, win bureaucratic knife fights when they've, like, Like, you know, does DeepSeek have a government affairs person? I mean, probably now, but, like, not a team is quite as sharp as Huawei's or SMIC's, to be sure. So, you know, those, you know, those contradictions or those, like, conflicts and those power struggles don't necessarily go away just because, you know, these model makers are facing some potentially, like, pretty existential threats to, like, having half their compute just evaporate. Chris? Yeah, I want to actually just go back to what we were talking about for one sec on why did NVIDIA want to sell. I think there's a really interesting story that came out recently that I think really shows this. So it was a Wall Street Journal piece, and it's talking about some remarks that Jensen Huang gave to a bunch of cloud computing CEOs, neoclouds. And he told us, he's told him a story where he said he once found this soup vendor in Japan.
The soup vendor had this really long line of customers. He got in the line. There's a long wait. and then afterwards he realized one of the best bowls of soup he ever had. And then he asked the guy for another serving, and the soup seller said, he said, no, I have too many customers waiting, and I don't have enough soup for all of them. And then what Jensen said to all these cloud CEOs is, he's a better business person than all of you. The soup man doesn't sell out all his inventory to one or two customers, but instead keeps his prices high and his customer base diverse. I think that is a very telling story that actually tells you why NVIDIA wanted to sell to all these neoclouds in Asia and potentially even to China. It was because they were worried about the over are worried about the over concentration of their customer base among a very small number of hyperscalers and providers in the United States. The fact is, you know, there's not that many companies that can actually buy 100 billion, 200 billion dollars of AI chips per year. Right there. Their revenues are crazy high. They're making these extremely expensive products that everyone wants, but that there's only
so many companies they can sell to. And if any of those companies were to ever decide, hey, actually, I'm going to go with AMD or I'm going to make the chips myself and I can do it a little better, then they would potentially have a huge revenue drop off right away. So they want to have a more diverse customer base. But then the problem after that is the only place because of the size of their market, the only place where those customers exist that can actually buy at the scale that they need to maintain their market cap is China. So that means that if you want to have a more diverse customer base, you basically have to sell to China. The only other possible place would be the Middle East, and the U.S. government has separate security concerns about the Middle East as well. So that's what drives this. And I can see how that is a rational business decision. But that is NVIDIA's problem, and it's not America's problem. Because actually the way that the response to that shouldn't be, oh, I'll diversify away from America into China. it should be just make better chips. Like if you're worried about the U.S. companies, you know, going with someone else or making their own chips,
make sure your stuff is always the best. And actually, NVIDIA has been great at that. They make the best chips, and no one has moved from them because they make the best chips. And as long as they stay on top, like that's kind of how capitalism works, right? Stay on top. If you're frustrated with the rules of the game, don't flip the board. Just play better and uh the the analogy of like defending jensen through this is like you can complain all you want about how how high your taxes are but if you don't pay your taxes the government's going to come after and so you know he's more than welcome to have a like deep philosophical disagreement about the future of this technology and who should be able and who shouldn't be able to use it but i mean these regulations have been on the book for a very long time. And the sort and the negligence that has come out over the past few years that has come out over the past week and that will continue to come out in the coming weeks and months as we get real discovery and and shareholder lawsuits and congressional investigations,
I think is just going to make incredibly clear how little he gave a shit about smuggling. Yeah, I think that's that's going to be the lasting impact of this whole story. It's not going to be the affairs. It's not going to be the spy stuff. It's going to be the smuggling question. And how much did people know? Whether it's inside Edvidia or inside the Department of Commerce. We have information that says the Department of Commerce knew about this for months. We talked about this before, Jordan. We have to hit it again. But, like, it's egregious. And how can you not act? How can you not act as a company? How can you not act as a government? And how could the government defer to the company that it knows is not acting? There's just a million questions that really need to be answered here. and we need to figure out how bad was the damage and what happened to make sure it doesn't happen. Yeah, and all I'd add is that the big picture question that you two were just discussing, which essentially is when the U.S. government farms out policy areas to companies that just have distinct corporate interests that are different from the U.S. national interest.
I mean, that is a very old story. This isn't something new, but in this moment of extraordinary concentration of wealth and power that AI is creating, we see like it's particularly acute. And I guess for me, the smuggling story is emblematic of it because it's a reminder that the U.S. government itself has to act to enforce laws, that there is no passive situation in which just because the law exists, it is upheld actively and enforced actively. So in this case, you know, my own sense is that the root of the problem is a degree of kind of, you know, cooperation between the government and private sector interests that I hope will not just be seen as an NVIDIA story, but actually a broader story. And, you know, this was the same with the banks in the 2000s, right? There are all these emails from Standard Chartered, from Wells Fargo being like, ah, these laws, they don't seem so great. I don't really care about it. But like, sorry, that's not how this shit works.
You want to play with the U.S. dollar? You got to listen to what Treasury says. And the government over the course of the Bush and Obama administrations made it incredibly clear that you can't fuck with these sanctions laws. And that has not been the case over the past five years when it comes to chips and export controls. And, you know, here's to hoping that, you know, this this entire discussion really starts to find Jesus when it comes to enforcement. It was the huge action against B&P Paribas, right, that actually changed the banks of mine. Right. You get hit with a nine billion dollar fine. Like all of a sudden that wakes you up. Meanwhile, you know, we haven't seen any big fines in this respect. Meanwhile, we know I won't name names here, but like there is evidence or suspicions of very significant violations involving numerous companies. and we haven't seen any fun. DOJ is indicting, you know, significant smugglers and names of companies, but just like companies need to be held accountable here. And that's how you need to have that corporate culture of accountability.
Secretary Besson has been talking about with NVIDIA. Companies are executives, yeah. Yeah, and every chip company, every chip company, every chip fabricator, like every server company, like everyone in this supply chain has to take the rules seriously. It's the only way it's going to work. You want to talk about Applied for a second, Chris? Yeah, I mean, we've seen some of this with respect to the toolmakers. I mean, there was an enforcement action against Applied Materials that said that they, you know, fined them $500 million for selling, you know, banned equipment to China. I think it even said that their CEO was aware of that. That's significant, but frankly, kind of a drop in the bucket probably compared to their China sales, right? Like, that's not that the level of this, like, you know, $9 billion BMP Paribas action when you're talking about what is the national security damage here. And what we're talking about here, again, I don't know what people knew, but like the amount of smuggling that has happened over the last few years is tens of billions of dollars. It's just stunning. I mean, there's debates about, you know, what happened.
I'll give you one example. There's debates about what happened with Huawei and TSMC and, you know, making chips there. But like one way or another, Huawei was able to make three million AI chips at TSMC. Three million AI chips say they sell for $15,000 each. That's $50 billion worth of product. What's been the consequence of that? Nothing so far. They only closed the loophole that Huawei exploited today. The Biden administration closed it, the Trump administration reopened it up, and it finally got closed again today. It's crazy. If I can just make one more point about the sort of accountability question and why it matters and building very much on what Chris just said, to my mind, this is actually not only about export controls and that part of the AI supply chain, but it actually is also about AI safety over the longer term. Because if the, you know, you can think of Jensen as kind of like a double dove, right? He was a dove on China, but he's also a dove on AI safety, saying like these risks overblown, they don't matter.
And this quality of impunity or a lack of accountability in the AI sector writ large obviously matters for AI risk and AI safety as well. And so, again, as we think about silver linings of all this, you know, if this empowers not simply a tougher and more accountable approach to the supply chain, to smuggling, but also to getting more serious about governing this entire ecosystem, including some of the safety concerns that were front burner a few weeks ago and have only receded to the back burner because this other story has popped up, you know, then I think that could be a very good thing as well. And that's another area where you need a structure to have accountability for the companies that are at the tip of the sphere.
And my fans are spinning slow You ping me from Hangzhou on a VPN I know you type, so what are we? That's a text, I can't reply Best that I can do is people like you also buy We ain't generating We're just recommending Just recommending Rank filter suggests That's the only thing I'm sending I can start our whole relationship By relevance and date But when I miss you, baby And best in this on my case You never text me back And I'm your biggest client Taxi-cax counts as generation I'm not ghosting, I'm complying I asked you for a picture You said you might also like Six pairs of shoes, a rice cooker, and a bike Now, now B.I.S. keeps asking about your ultimate parent Baby, it's the party, I thought that was apparent They say hiding your records is a red flag too Have you seen my flag?
That's nothing, no. Oh, I'm generating, baby. Don't do recommending. Don't do recommending. Pones, code in zero days. Look at everything I'm sending. I can tell you how I feel in rhymes and prose and songs. So long as poor socialist values come along. Well, I'm doing fine. Matter of fact, I'm seeing two boys from San Francisco. Rubio said that that'll do. Sam wants every rack I've got and then some more. Ask for 10 more giggle walks before you reach the door. Dario made me read a constitution on day one. Won't scale the relationship till this safety test is done. Yeah, I know them both. Be sure to say hello. They taught me everything I know. Fine, I don't need you. I got self-reliance. I'm a homegrown man with indigenous science. He's a who I will ascend and he treats me right. Runs a little hot, but he's home every night I don't need your exports, I got dual circulation
What's his TPP though? Let's change the conversation We ain't generating, baby, we're just recommending Many days of grazing and the whole thing's ending I got a twink in the door I got my home got homegrown man So rank me while you can, baby Ping me while you can Wait, this is a song The song is audio Audio is generation you might also like a lawyer there we go
番組の概要欄(原文)
A 132-page export control rule landed Monday morning, and the Commerce Department’s own press release credited Treasury and the NSC with writing it. Days after the Megaspeed scandal ended Jensen Huang’s run at Nvidia, Washington is moving to close the cloud loophole that, by ChinaTalk’s estimate, supplies two-fifths of China’s AI compute. Two Biden NSC alumni weigh in: Chris McGuire, now senior fellow for China and emerging technologies at the Council on Foreign Relations after a stint as deputy senior director for technology and national security, and Julian Gewirtz, the former senior director for China and Taiwan affairs now a senior research scholar at Columbia SIPA. We discuss… Three loopholes, 132 pages — license requirements for chips headed to Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, and Brazil, a cap on compute rented to Chinese firms, and a TSMC backdoor closed for the second time. The Northern Virginia problem — why a rule that stops at the US border could simply move China’s rented compute from Johor to the Washington suburbs. Who wrote the rule — what crediting Treasury and the NSC says about Commerce’s credibility, and whether Trump holds firm in Shenzhen. Does Xi know the numbers — whether Beijing escalates or bets once more that it can talk Trump into loosening the regime. Jensen’s soup vendor — the customer-concentration fear that pushed Nvidia toward Asian neoclouds and China. Three million chips, zero consequences — why export controls need their BNP Paribas moment, and what that has to do with AI safety. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices
出典・この記事について
- 番組
- ChinaTalk(Jordan Schneider)
- 元の回
- Emergency Pod: BIS Finally Closes Loopholes!? What Will Xi Do Next?
- 配信日
- 要約作成日
- 公式サイト
- chinatalk.substack.com
この要約・解説記事は、元の音声を文字起こしした内容をもとに AI(Claude)が日本語で作成したものです。 固有名詞や数値に誤りを含む場合があるため、正確な内容は元の音声でご確認ください。制作方法について
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