ロバート・カロ、91歳の伝記作家が語る――モーゼス、ジョンソン、そして執筆の流儀

Robert Caro – The master biographer reflects at 91

Dwarkesh Podcast1時間1分
ロバート・カロ、91歳の伝記作家が語る――モーゼス、ジョンソン、そして執筆の流儀

ロバート・カロ、91歳の伝記作家が語る――モーゼス、ジョンソン、そして執筆の流儀

Dwarkesh Podcast

0:001:01:10

要約

Dwarkesh Patelが、『The Power Broker』『Years of Lyndon Johnson』の著者ロバート・カロにインタビューした回。カロは証言を引き出す取材術、ロバート・モーゼスの理想主義から冷酷さへの変化、ジョンソンの権力の源泉、本を一文に絞る執筆法を語る。未収録資料のアーカイブをニューヨーク歴史協会に託した理由や、孤独が仕事と人生に与えた影響にも触れている。

この回のポイント

  • ●カロは、取材を断る相手でも「話してもらうしかない」と粘る。具体的な質問を重ねることで、本当の話が出てくると語る。
  • ●モーゼスは当初、市民にビーチを届ける理想主義者だったが、反対者を排除し人々を立ち退かせる冷酷な人物へ変わったと述べる。
  • ●現代の「建設の停滞」についてカロは、モーゼスの時代にも同じ不満があったと指摘し、時折現れる政治的天才が大事業を実現するという見方を示した。
  • ●ジョンソンの説得力の背後には、委員会人事や法案を左右できる権力があったと説明する。
  • ●本は着手前に「一文」で言い表せるまで考え抜くべきだと、『The Power Broker』の失敗から学んだ教訓を語る。
  • ●『The Power Broker』は105万語から35万語を削った。資料は利用しやすいようニューヨーク歴史協会に寄贈した。

章立て

  1. 人に語らせる取材術

    カロが自身をジョンソンやモーゼスの執拗さに重ね、取材拒否の相手からどう話を引き出すかを語る。

  2. 今の米国にモーゼスは必要か

    建設の停滞や環境審査をめぐる議論に対し、カロは政治的天才が大事業を成すという見方を示す。

  3. 理想主義者から冷酷な権力者へ

    若きモーゼスの改革志向と、クロス・ブロンクス高速道路に象徴される変質を語る。

  4. 権力を失うモーゼスを見つめて

    執筆中にモーゼスが力を失う様子や、ロックフェラーへの辞任の脅しが通じなかった理由を述べる。

  5. 大恐慌と建築の美しさ

    大恐慌期の安価な労働力がモーゼスの事業を支えた点と、過去の建築が装飾的だった理由を語る。

  6. ジョンソンの権力とケネディとの違い

    ジョンソンの説得力の裏にある権力、ストーブンソンへの思い、ケネディとの違いを論じる。

  7. 一文に絞る執筆法と資料の行方

    本を一文に絞る方法、削られた原稿、アーカイブを寄贈した理由を語る。

  8. ヒルカントリーと孤独

    ジョンソンの育った辺境の孤独と、カロ自身の孤独な執筆生活を振り返る。

解説記事

伝記作家ロバート・カロが91歳で、Dwarkesh Podcastに出演した。ニューヨークの建設王ロバート・モーゼスを描いた『The Power Broker』と、リンドン・ジョンソンの伝記シリーズの著者である。取材の執念、権力の変質、執筆の方法論、そして孤独について、率直に語った回である。

断られても退かない取材術

カロはまず、ジョンソンやモーゼスと自分に共通するのは「ノーを受け入れない」点だと認める。ジョンソンの最初の秘書など、「この人に聞くしかない」と思う相手がいれば、どうにかして話してもらうと述べる。

相手が話したがらない場合に効くのは、的確な質問だという。ジョンソンの資金配分を担当したジョン・コナリーには、金額を書き込んだ指示の中に「no, never」という書き込みがあった理由を尋ねた。その人物はジョンソンから金を受け取れない運命だったとの答えを得て、さらにその理由を聞くことで興味深い話が出てきたと語っている。

モーゼスの変質と「建設」をめぐる問い

聞き手は、第二アベニュー地下鉄やカリフォルニアの高速鉄道を挙げ、現代は建設が難しすぎるのではと問う。カロは、モーゼスが動き出した1920年代にも「政府は何も建てられない」と言われていたと指摘する。地権者の反対が強く道路は不可能と見られていたが、モーゼスはジョーンズビーチへの道路建設を成し遂げた。カロはこれを政治的天才と意志の産物と呼ぶ。そのうえで、何十年も現れない時期があっても、時折そういう人物が現れて事が進むという見方を示した。ただし、冷酷で世論を無視する人物は望まないとも述べている。

カロが強調するのは、モーゼスが「すべて悪」ではないことだ。本の最初の数百ページは、公務員制度の改革やビーチの開放に尽力した若い理想主義者の物語だという。それが次第に、誰の意見も聞かず、何万人を立ち退かせても道路を通す人物へと変わった。クロス・ブロンクス高速道路は、開通直後から世界一長い渋滞と呼ばれたと述べる。反対した政治家ヘンリー・エプスタインに対しては、不倫を公にして潰したという例を挙げた。若い頃に挫折した経験から、人の弱みを使うことを学んだというのがカロの見立てである。

カロはモーゼスが権力を失う過程も取材中に目撃した。かつて電話が絶えなかった執務室で、最後のインタビュー中に一本も電話が来なかった場面を、哀れさとともに回想している。モーゼス自身は、最後まで自分の変化を自覚しなかっただろうとカロは見る。8回目の取材が叶うなら聞きたい質問は「自分が変わっていることに気づいていたか」だという。

ジョンソンの権力と「もしも」

ジョンソンの力の源泉について、カロは説得力の背後にある権力だと答える。委員会人事や法案の行方を左右できる立場だったため、肩を抱いて迫られた相手はその力を意識せざるを得なかったという。

『Means of Ascent』に登場するコーク・スティーブンソンについては、上院議員になっていれば優れた成果を残しただろうと述べ、敗北を悲劇と見ている。ケネディが大統領でジョンソンが院内総務に留まった場合、公民権や貧困対策の法律は同じように成立したかとの問いには、否と答えた。ケネディは魅力的で外交には強かったが、アメリカを変えたいという強い欲求はジョンソン固有のものだと語る。ジョンソンがなぜベトナムで拡大を続けたかについては、いま取り組み中の次巻の主題であり、まだ解明の途中だとした。

一文に絞る執筆法と、残された資料

何年も原稿を他人に見せない中で、どう軌道を保つのか。カロの答えは、着手前に本の全体を考え抜き、「この本は何についてか」を一文、多くても一段落に絞ることだ。『The Power Broker』ではこれを怠って苦労したと語る。同書は原稿が105万語に達し、編集者ボブ・ゴットリーブと協力して約35万語を削ったという。

デジタルアーカイブの恩恵は、ベトナム戦争を扱う現在の執筆では大きい。ただ過去の巻でも、資料を見つけることより読むことの方が大きな作業だったため、大差はなかっただろうと述べる。

未収録の資料は、ニューヨーク歴史協会に寄贈した。他機関からはより高額の提示があったが、ニューヨークにあって誰でも利用しやすいことを優先したという。例として、下院を動かしたサム・レイバーンには良い伝記がなく、必要な材料は自分の資料にあると語った。

辺境の孤独と作家の孤独

終盤では、ジョンソンの故郷ヒルカントリーの暮らしが話題になる。母親が経験した孤独や、高齢の関係者に教わった道を22マイル走っても一軒の家も通らなかった経験を、カロは紹介した。アメリカは、そうした孤独に耐えた人々の英雄性を十分理解していないのではないかと語る。

カロ自身も、執筆日は電話を切り、日中は誰とも話さない生活を送る。それが時に辛く、折り返しを理解しない人もいると述べた。

まとめ

本回は、権力者の「良い面と悪い面」を切り離さずに描く伝記の姿勢がよくわかる内容だった。建設の停滞やリーダーシップを論じる際に、モーゼスをどう評価するかは今も示唆に富む。「一文に絞る」という執筆法や、未収録資料を後世に託す判断は、長期のプロジェクトに取り組む技術者や研究者にも通じる教訓だろう。

文字起こし(英語・自動生成)

If you do everything, you will win. That is the maxim by which Lyndon Johnson lived his life. My guest today is Robert Caro, and over the 50 years that he has spent writing about Lyndon Johnson, he has lived in the edges of the Texas whole country to understand the poverty and loneliness of Johnson's youth. He has sifted through millions of documents in the Senate and presidential libraries of the entire nation, and he has chased down for interviews the former goon who helped Johnson steal an election to the chauffeur who drove him on his first desperate campaign. In other words, my guest today is a man who understands Johnson's aphorism, if you do everything, you'll win. Mr. Carr, it is such a huge honor to have you on the show. It's great to be here. So my first question is just this that I hinted in the introduction. How much do you see yourself represented in Johnson or in Moses? It's part of the reason you're able to write so compellingly about them,

that you share some of their qualities. Well, let me say first, I think, I hope they are qualities that I will share. Among other things, they're so, I'll use the word, ruthless. You know, you say they do anything to win. That's part of their greatness. You know, I remember when I started learning about Robert Moses, I went to the LaGuardia papers, which were in a, they were kept in the boat basin. They were stored by the municipal archives. Literally in the 79th Street boat basin on the Hudson River, three levels down, there were this row of file cabinets, you know, against the wall. So I'm sitting there day after day going through these documents, and occasionally I'd come across a note that Robert Moses wrote,

and I realized I'm following the same path he was. So it's fascinating, actually. Well, obviously not all the qualities, but the quality I'm referring to here is that just like Johnson, or just like Moses, you refuse to take no for an answer, If somebody says, I won't give you an interview, you don't stop there. You refuse to leave a stone unturned. And so there is a relentlessness that you share with these subjects. I'm going to take that as a compliment. Yes. Well, you feel there are certain people that you have to interview. and if they don't want to give you an interview, you can't, I feel, you can't say no. Like you say Lyndon Johnson's first secretary, the one who rode in the car with him on the campaigns. I said, there's no other human being on earth who knows what Lyndon Johnson is doing

all these hours driving back and forth across Texas. I don't know what I have to do, but I have to get them to tell me honestly about this thing. So this raises another question that I wanted to ask you, which is you're interviewing all these people. And in many cases, they know, they must know that it's not good for them to tell you what you want to know. And in many cases, they tell you anyways. how do you get people to tell you things that they know they shouldn't tell you? You ask terrific questions. Sometimes you're sitting there and you know this person doesn't want to talk to you about what you want to get out from like John Connolly on how Johnston used money to get political power. And I'm thinking, but I've been through the notes. Connolly collected the money and gave it out at Johnson's instructions.

So he's the only guy who can tell me how Johnson did this, you know, how he judged who to give money to. Sometimes Johnson would write on a request for money. If the guy asked for $1,500, Johnson would write, okay, $1,500. Sometimes he'd write, $500. Sometimes he'd write, no. But sometimes he'd write, no, never. And I asked Connolly, what did that mean? And he said, this guy was never going to get money from Lyndon Johnson. So then when you ask why he felt this way about this particular congressman, that's when the really fascinating stories emerge. Before we get more into Johnson, I want to first start with Moses. Sure. So in the last decade or two, people have been complaining that it's become too hard and too difficult to build things.

Yes. Especially for the government to build things. Yes. So if you look at the 2nd Avenue subway, they've been building it for around 50 years. Yes. They opened up a mile and a half. Yes. It cost more than $4 billion. And people have been saying, we were concerned. The Power Broker came out. It was an immensely influential book. and we were concerned about so much power being centralized and given, delegated to one person so they could build. And we wanted to prevent that, and so we made environmental review and land use review and community boards and litigation. And people say, we've overcorrected. We've gone too far in the other direction. What do you think of that? They also say, because of all these safeguards, Robert Moses could not operate in the same way today. But the fact is, when Robert Moses started, there were also safeguards. People were also saying, you can't build anything.

This was in the 1920s. People were saying, government can't build anything. There are too many blocks. Nothing's getting built. We need highways. It's the age of cars. Everyone's getting automobiles. But we have the same old roads, and nobody can build them because the property owners don't want the roads built through their land. Robert Moses comes along, and all of a sudden those things vanish because he, despite all the safeguards and everything else, he just builds. So doing the power broker, it was just fascinating to me to see how he gets around everything. But it doesn't matter what it is, he's going to build a beach at Jones Beach. He sees it one day, he says, this is the greatest beach I've ever seen. It's only 27 miles from New York City. if I can build a road out here

I will give the people of New York City this great beach but it seems impossible to build that road because the property owners don't want the road going through their farms and property but he basically says I'm going to build it and to watch him do it to overcome each obstacle there's so many and then all of a sudden it's open and you have Jones Beach and you have it accessible to New York. It's an act of political genius and it's also an act of will that I'm going to do it. That's fascinating to learn about. And so you think today, if there was a Moses-type figure, they would figure out a way to work around everything that's been set up. Well, the answer to that is when Moses was building, they were saying the same thing. Nobody's ever going to build.

We need roads for the automobiles, but they'd have to go through hundreds, dozens of farms, scores of property. No one's ever going to be able to do it. But he comes along and does it. so today someone would come along and do it this i think is a profound question for democracies which is how do we end up in a place which is not the extremes of 50s or 60s moses but not also where we are now so where i live in california we've spent i don't know 15 billion dollars over the last decade and we haven't gotten a single new line or single new mile of railway that those 15 billion dollars have been spent to build whereas a different system you could say china today is like new york city in the 40s and 50s where you have a very moses type attitude and they put up tens of thousands of miles of railways over the last 10 20 years but of course at the cost of

similar amounts of displacements of people and recklessness. So how do we land in a good spot between either extreme? I'm not sure there is a good spot. What you just said is the situation. To build anything on a large scale, you're confronted with dozens or scores or perhaps hundreds of property owners who don't want it built there. So the question is, how does anything get built? Then someone comes along and can do it. Now, when Robert Moses started, it seemed impossible, actually impossible, to build roads out into Long Island because a road would have to cross scores of properties. most of which the people didn't want the roads coming and had the power to stop them then

because he didn't have the power of eminent domain then. But Moses said, basically, I'm going to build it. And he would find a way to overcome each difficulty. Now you say, what am I trying to say by that? Trying to say that every once in a while someone comes along who's sort of a genius, if that's the right word, at getting big things built for the public. Decades may pass when there's no one like that. And you say everything's stalled, nothing big is ever going to be built again. And then someone suddenly comes along, and all of a sudden, things get built. that's the nature of political genius. I happen to be writing about two guys, Lyndon Johnson and Robert Moses, who in both cases, Johnson with civil rights

and Moses with public works, where people were saying you can't do this, but they did it. Correct me if I'm putting words in your mouth, but if I may attempt an interpretation, Of what you said? Yes. It sounds like you think we need a little Moses today. Oh, a great insight. I sometimes wonder about just what you said. And the answer is, well, I certainly don't want someone who's ruthless and disregarding public opinion as a Robert Moses. But at the same time, you need someone who's going to find a way to get things built. and he's going to have to find a way despite the fact that so many people don't want it built.

A lot of people who haven't read the book have this impression that you think everything Moses did was bad and that we need to make sure that we can never have a Moses again. Yes. And so it's interesting to hear you say that we need a little Moses again. Well, when people say to me everything was bad that he did, what I say is you didn't read the book. Because certainly the first parts of the book, well, hundreds of pages, are about a young idealist who sees this great need for recreation, for beaches on Long Island, for the city people, and is going to get a way to make them accessible to people in the city. You say, and it's an act of genius and willpower, the way he does it. And that's great. Now, does it become, does it evolve into where Moses listens to nobody

and the only thing that matters is what he wants to get built? It does evolve into that. He does change. But the young Moses, the idealist, who before he's building is an expert in civil service, technicalities of civil service, and devotes all his energies to trying to reform the civil service and make it that people get promoted on merit instead of political pull. And he works so hard in that. You see a real idealism. And you see an idealism in his early works, you know, when you say, I want to make these beaches accessible to New York. Now, does that evolve into where I think there ought to be a highway here, no matter what anybody says, no matter how many thousands of people are in the way, like the cross-runs from first place, I'll evict them.

It does. He changes. That to me is a big part of the story of the power broker how this guy who in the beginning a young idealistic guy who wants to build to make lives better for people to give them access to the ocean beaches and all changes into someone who just wants to build because he thinks something should be built no matter what anyone else says, and is going to do it no matter how many thousands, hundreds of thousands of people has to evict, no matter how bad an idea it is, like the Cross Bronx Expressway. People are telling him not to do that before he does it. The minute this road opens, it's the world's longest traffic jam. Not thousands, but tens of thousands of people were evicted,

thrown out of their homes by him without any relocation provisions. So you say, in a way, it's a story of how do you give somebody power without the power in a way hardening, I don't want to use the word corrupting him, but hardening him to anyone who opposes him, to any opposition. Coding agents work best when they get fast, detailed feedback. My sponsor, Antithesis, gives your agents some of the richest feedback there is by running every change they make through thousands of hostile simulations. This usually isn't feasible. Simulation testing is hard. It normally requires rebuilding your software around a fake networking clock, among other things. So most teams don't bother. Even if they do, getting enough coverage typically takes hours.

So they run these simulations overnight. by which point all the day's changes are jumbled together, and it's harder for the agents to tell which PR broke something. Antithesis solves both problems. It runs your software inside a fully deterministic simulated computer, so you don't have to rebuild anything yourself. And it explores fast enough that you can test every PR. On a recent project, it packed 15 hours of simulation testing into each 15-minute run. That speed comes from both parallelism and branching. Because it's deterministic, whenever Antithesis finds an interesting state, it can save that exact moment and branch off hundreds of different futures. It never wastes time replaying events, hoping to stumble across that state again. And it doesn't just explore randomly. Antithesis systematically injects faults and tweaks your system in the ways most likely to break. So every minute in Antithesis is one of the unluckiest hours your software will ever experience. Learn more at antithesis.com slash more cash.

You're writing the book. You start writing it in 66, 67. Yes. You're writing it while Moses is losing power. His career is not over yet. Yes. And so the story changes. Yes. While you're writing it. Yes. And I don't know if you've talked about that, But presumably the conclusion changes because you don't know whether he's going to lose that power or not. No, and I watch, oh, that's a great question. And I watched that happen. And I'm a young, I'm, whenever I was young, and whatever my age was, I didn't really know what I was doing. And I watched him lose power. and I learned enough about him to know how sad this was going to be. If I could think a moment, there's a moment that this happened. Yeah.

His office was still up at the Troyboro Bridge Authority. When he was in power, I interviewed him in that office several times. you felt his power, you felt outside there were all these people waiting for his decisions sitting around waiting for his decisions as soon as I finished the secretary would come in with a list of telephone calls of people who would call asking for you know, wanting something from him while I was talking to him, right? by the time I finished I remember I realized I had one long interview with him maybe it was my last one and I realized there had been no calls the secretary had nothing to tell him so whatever you thought of Moses you felt the poignance of someone losing power

yeah that's fascinating that's what I was wondering about Yeah. You couldn't help feeling shares for him, no matter, even though you knew what he had done. You couldn't help feeling, oh, this is, in a way, tragic, that no one's calling and asking him for a favor anymore. Yeah. Did he realize that was happening? I don't think he really, I don't think, in a way, I'm sure he did. But by that time, he was so, remember, he was so insulated. He was so, whatever his age was, he was up in the 80s. He was deaf, you know. He still had, at the Triborough headquarters on Randall's Island, were all these Moses men who were loyal to him

and treated him with the same deference they always had. He knew he wasn't getting his projects done, but he felt, I know he felt he was just going to keep pushing like he always did, and he was going to win again. So the answer to the question is no, I don't think he did ever realize that. That's fascinating. Yeah. in I think 62 as you say he tries to pull a trick on Nelson Rockefeller that he had pulled on countless previous mayors and governors which is to threaten to resign if he didn't get his way yes and Rockefeller says I regretfully accept and nothing happens and that made me wonder as I was reading it So could all those previous governors and mayors who were getting threatened have done the same thing? Great, great question.

Yeah, the answer is yes. Well, you say could they have done the same thing. So the first part, the answer is yes. They had the power to fire him. He wasn't an elected official. but they couldn't there wasn't really a possibility the answer to the question at the bottom is no they couldn't because he was simply too popular you know you couldn't fire Robert Moses you know that's like firing some idol person who was the idol of New York but in addition he had with his genius He had created in all his different posts a chairman of the State Power Authority, chairman of the Triberto Bridge Authority, Parks Commissioner, Long Island Parks Commissioner, Jones Beach Commissioner.

He had created such an interlocking, you couldn't fire him from everything because the terms ended in different ways and some you didn't have the power to fire him from, that he had really made it impossible, well, almost impossible, because at the end, if you wanted to do it, Rockefeller did it. But by that time, cracks had appeared in the armor. I think for decades, the answer to your question is, you couldn't do it. But then as he got older, cracks appeared in the armor, and you could, if you wanted to brave criticism in all the newspapers and public criticism and everything else, you probably could have done it. Good question. Which leads into the next question I want to ask you. So you interviewed him seven times, and the seventh time you mentioned your awareness of a donation that was made to his commission by a millionaire whose golf course was spared by the new route for his parkway.

And after that, he didn't talk to you again. If you had gotten an eighth interview with Robert Moses, what is the one question you would most want to ask him? Oh, God, what a great, great question. Well, you know, off the top of my head, I think if I only had one question to ask him, I think I'd ask him, did you realize you were changing? Hmm. That's a great question you asked. But that's the answer I'll give for now. That's something I always wanted, would like to have asked him. Do you think he realized that he was changing? No.

I think he felt from the beginning that he had this vision for building roads here and their parks here. that was the best thing to do and it was going to get done and it should get done no matter how many hardships he had to inflict on people no matter how many thousands he had to evict no matter what he had to do he was going to get the roads built and you see this increasing ruthlessness this utter ruthlessness of him if someone stood in his way He was going to find a way to remove that person as an obstacle. I mean, I'll give you an example of that if you want. There's a politician in the Bronx named Henry Epstein. Henry Epstein is opposing the Cross Bronx Expressway. He's saying to Robert Moses, you're putting it right through a neighborhood where you have to evict tens of thousands of people.

You can just move it two blocks to the south and you only have to evict a couple of hundred people. Moses sets out to destroy Epstein and basically does by making it known he's having an affair. If he can find a weakness in somebody, that he has a mistress, that he's taking money or something, he'll use it. He'll use whatever he has to to get things done. He learns that, in my opinion, by failing to get things done when he's very young. He has things that he wants to get done, and they don't get done. And the awareness comes on him, and we can see it in the book, or in my learning about him. I try to show how he learns that he has to find weaknesses in people. He has to use it.

If he has a weakness, he's going to use it. He's going to get things done. There's a hardening, an increased ruthlessness, where the only thing that matters is to get the thing done. And anyone who stands in his way, if Moses has to destroy him, he'll destroy him. As you say, you're writing not the history of one man, but of an era in America. And one of the most interesting things about the power broker is, especially in the period in which he's able to accomplish so much so quickly, what's happening and you talk about this is the Great Depression you know he's hiring thousands of architects tens of thousands of linemen for pennies on the dollar to do big public works for the city and so I wonder how

big a part of Moses' early achievements is just that the government because of the Great Depression could compete with the private sector for the top talent and for lots and lots of labor working 24-7 through the winter, moving fast? Yes, and the answer to your question is that played a big role because he needed architects for something. I don't remember what it is. It's in the power broker. And they lined up on Fifth Avenue thousands of out-of-work architects, you know, that he could hire for very low wages. But more than the wages, they were available, you know, because they didn't have anything to do. He was able to hire so many people and hire and fire them in a ruthless way, you know,

making the workmen work hard, you know. He could just fire them. It was a depression, and they didn't have other jobs to go to. I think that was, he used that, yes. So, as somebody who has studied urban development so deeply, here is one thing I'm curious about you look at the things that were built at the beginning of the last century or before the beginning of the last century Grand Central Station and all the beautiful architecture in New York versus the things that are built in the second half of the century they look a lot less beautiful and the earlier more beautiful things were built by a much poorer country yeah what what changed why were able to build more beautiful things before? one thing that changed is you had all these out artisans who could we just say carve stonework on buildings Like my apartment is on the 15th floor of an apartment house

Across the street is a building that's 15 stories or 16 stories high. and you say, look at all the beautiful carving that's done in the stonework of that building up on the roof. I said, the only person who can see it is the people in my apartment and the people in the apartment next to them. Someone was willing to spend that money because the builders who built that could hire skilled people at such low wages that they could make them do the decorations to make a building beautiful up on floors that nobody is going to see them because people came cheap. If you want your agents to do real work, they need to be able to use the tools that your company runs on. Things like email or Slack or Stripe. But giving them unfettered access is risky because they can send confidential information to a customer or refund a bunch of payments that they shouldn't have.

Of course, you could just review every request manually, but that doesn't typically last. That's why my sponsor, WorkOS, built Airlock. It's a judgment layer that sits between your agents and your tools. Any time that an agent wants to do something, it makes a request to Airlock, which evaluates it against your company's policies and decides whether to allow it, block it, or escalate it to a human. Whenever a request is allowed, Airlock takes the relevant action for the agent, hitting the necessary endpoints and passing along the response. That way, your agents never see your API keys, and so they can't leak them or use them for unauthorized purposes. Since Airlock holds the keys to all your tools, it has to be rock solid. Fortunately, WorkOS has spent the better part of the last decade building auth and permissions products, and they're battle-tested. More than 3,000 companies rely on WorkOS, including OpenAI and Anthropic. Airlock is an early access. If you're interested, go to workos.com slash airlock.

I want to ask you about Johnson now. Okay. Master of the Senate, you make two points about how Johnson is affected, or at least this is the way I read it. One is that he is very persuasive if you're talking to him. Yes. The other is he's put himself in a position of leverage such that he has things to promise you or things to threaten you with. So it's not that he's convinced you of anything, but you know that you need his favor if you want to be successful. Exactly. And of the two, I'm curious, which was really the source of his power? His leverage or his persuasion? Behind his persuasion was the power. When you were talking to him, if he asked something of you, you knew he had the power behind him to give you or deny you things that you wanted. Say he was asking a senator something for a vote on a specific issue.

The senator might not agree with him, might not want to give him the vote, but he would know he wants a committee assignment. Johnson has the power to give him that or not. Or he would know he wants a specific law and Johnson has the power to get that law passed or not. So behind everything, Johnson is talking to you and he puts his arm around you and he leans into you. It's not just the force of his personality that he's bringing to bear on you. Behind that personality, you know he has the power to do things to you or for you that you better be aware of. Means of Ascent, the book about the election with Cook-Stevenson, the 1948 Senate election. Yes. That is my favorite book perhaps ever. and you paint such a compelling portrait of this person,

Koch Stevenson, you know, governor of Texas. They call him Mr. Texas. Yes. As you were writing his profile and writing this book, did part of you wish that he had won the Senate election? You couldn't help. I'm not sure. You couldn't help. Well, I'll answer you directly. The answer is yes. I think Koch Stevenson, although he was an idealist, he knew how to get things done. When he was governor of Texas, he really accomplished things, okay? I think if he went to the Senate, he would have been a great senator and accomplished things. So you wish that he had won. you feel the tragedy that he lost because of the way he lost. You know, the things about Koch seems that he really didn't realize someone could do all the things to him and in the election that Lyndon Johnson did.

He didn't come to grips with that. suppose that Kennedy wins in 60 but Johnson refuses the vice presidency so he's still a majority leader how different do you think the bills that Kennedy would pass under Johnson's majority leader would be from the laws that Johnson as president was eventually able to pass That is to say, the things that happened in 64 and 63 and 65, would they have just happened earlier? No, because Kennedy did not have the overriding desire to change America. We know that John Kennedy was utterly charming. He was a good president. He was good in foreign policy, where Johnson certainly was not. But what he did not have was this vision, this desire to change America that Lyndon Johnson had.

Lyndon Johnson comes back from his year teaching the poor kids in Ketula, determined to change the education system to help poor people more. to do all these other things to help poor people. That determination is something that's really unique. It's what made him domestically such a great president, that we have all these civil rights laws, these anti-poverty laws, that we wouldn't have had without Lyndon Johnson. His presidency ends in tragedy because of foreign policy, because of Vietnam. But he has this desire to get things done to help people in America that's almost unique. You say, gee, he's determined to do this, you know.

He's going to find a way to do it. You watch him doing it. Then you say he was doing it when his attention turns to Vietnam and everything falls apart. And he makes it, his presidency is ruined. The things he started out to do domestically don't get done in the way he would have done them. But he starts out after the election with the education laws, with the anti-poverty bills to change the country. And he's on his way to doing it. That's the great tragedy of Johnson in Vietnam. If I can ask about that, and it's okay if you don't want to talk about this because it's in the next book. But if you're willing to talk about it. fundamentally why did Johnson keep escalating

even when you know the answer to your question is I'm still trying to figure that out right now so I'm not going to because that's quite a mystery yeah one of the things that's true of both Johnson and Moses is this inexhaustible energy you know working 16 hours a day, sometimes even more than that. And I wonder how much you think that is the fact that they had a different constitution, that they were just, had different reserves of energy, or do you think it was just their will was so strong? I think it's just their will. I mean, a lot of people have their energy. You know, when you see Robert Moses sleeping very little, showing that he'd do anything to get his way, to get things done. Being tired is something that doesn't even seem to figure into the equation.

Sometimes I'm looking at, you know, I can't remember one off the top of my head, and you say he's making this call and Johnson's making this call at 2 and 3 o'clock in the morning. He's up making these calls to get his way. In fact, there's a funny anecdote. One Senator Johnson calls him at 5 a.m. to ask him for his vote on something, and the Senator says, oh, Lyndon, I was just lying here waiting for your call. So it's their role. I want to ask you a little bit about writing biography now. Okay. One question I have is you spend five years, ten years writing a single book. And through that process, maybe your editor and your wife are the only people who have seen the manuscript. So how do you make sure you're on the right track?

because you've got to wait so long from when you start to when you get public feedback. How do you make sure that everything's going to hang together and you're pursuing the message that way you want to? Well, part of your question is how do you be sure you're on the right track? The answer to that is you're not, okay? But how do you try to stay on the right track? I do have a device for that. before I start a book I learned this the hard way with the power broker because I didn't do it with the power broker before I start a book I think through what I want the book to be the whole book people say you mean you think it through to the end well the answer is yes and then you say well what is this book about I said that sometimes for a long time before I start writing,

when I'm thinking about the book, just asking myself in one way or another, what is this book about? You've got to get it down to one sentence. You say, well, you can't get it down to one sentence. Then you say, yeah, but, Bob, you learned you better get it down to one sentence, or three years from now you're going to be writing and you're going to be saying, What am I trying to do? So before I start a book, I try to get it down to, I said a sentence, or at most a paragraph, and say, really, what is this book about? And I try to make everything hang together around that point. Back in August, my sponsor, GeneStreet, released the design files for a mystery chip and challenge my audience to figure out its true purpose. The challenge is over, and Jane Street has released a blog post highlighting some of their favorite submissions. They also reveal the ASIC's purpose.

I won't spoil it here, but if you're curious, I've linked to it in the show notes. Anish, who helped design the puzzle, walked me through some of the best write-ups. I think my favorite submission was probably this insane visualization made by Charton Vandriel and Leander Post, who started by showing in 3D how a chip is made from standard cells, how all of the metal layers fit together to actually comprise the logic of the chip, and then showed each component of our puzzle design, what it does, and how they reverse engineered it before then showing how it all fits back together into the puzzle. Don't worry if you missed this challenge. There's a new one live right now. So the goal with this new challenge is we want people to design a hardware protocol emulator chip that can be used to analyze and emulate different communication protocols. And as a bonus, we're going to pay to fabricate our favorite submissions, and you'll actually get your chip back mounted on a board ready for you to test in real life. The competition is open until January 18th. Go to jainestreet.com slash Larkesh to get started.

A lot of your books you've written before we had digital archives and the internet and all the resources that made available. How much of a difference have those resources made? Well, they're making a big difference right now. In the book I'm doing now, I'm writing about Vietnam. Let's say I want to do a battle. I want to write in detail. Well, this just happened. I want to write about it. I picked a battle that I wanted to do in detail. It's called the Battle of the Yard-Drying Valley. Nobody's written about it in detail. But I could go to my computer and I could look up where are the oral histories from soldiers who fought in that battle. And you just, what colleges are the oral histories at? What documents are available in a way you couldn't do it before?

And do you think it would have made a big difference when you were writing the earlier volumes? No. Well it might have made things faster but it wouldn just the way I am I would look at the documents anyway Things would go faster now But I think about what you just asked I was thinking about it the other day and it's difficult for me to explain it, but I don't think it would have gone any faster. I can't quite tell you why, but certainly you could find the documents faster. but finding them is a small thing compared to reading them. A question just occurs to me, and I'm curious to get your answer. If we were able to time travel back to 75,

and I could tell Robert Caro then that this new three volumes on Lyndon Johnson he's about to embark on will take more than 40 years, how do you think 40-something girl Robert Curo would have reacted to that? Would he have been happy? Would he have been afraid? He asked terrific questions. Well, you know, the realization came to me when I was thinking about Johnson. You know, the power, I'll give you a long answer, but this is the accurate answer. I had to cut so much out of the power broker. And I cut out so much stuff that shouldn't have been cut out, that I didn't, like I gave Bob Gottlieb, my editor, a manuscript that was 1,050,000 words long. And the most they

could fit in, and he really worked at this into one volume, because I was determined it would only be one volume, was 700 pages, or about 700,000 words, instead of 1,050,000 words, which meant we had to cut 350,000 words. And he has said, I cut a lot of the best stuff I ever read. And I felt a lot of the stuff that I cut out, it's tragic that no one knows it. To this day, people ask me about things. I said, oh, I wrote that. And they said, well, no one ever read it. But the way I am, I don't know that it would have changed anything. Because as I'm writing the book, I'm saying, oh, this is too long. this is going to be too long, I'm going to have to cut so much.

But I don't seem to have the ability not to write the stuff that I think should be written, even though I know so much of it is going to have to be cut. Well, speaking of which, you have in the other room here, cabinets and cabinets of notes on interviews, notes as you're working, things which have never been published before. Eventually, historians, other historians, will be able to study those notes and those documents that you have compiled over your career. Yes. What is it that you hope they do with it? What is it that you hope, what kind of scholarship do you hope? You know, I cut out so much stuff from the books that I wish people knew, okay? I mean, sometimes you're reading something and you're saying, oh, if I had written about that, the newspapers wouldn't be covering it the same way.

There'd be a different understanding of it. I'll give you an easy example. Sam Rayburn. Now, I have a brief chapter on Rayburn in my books. But Rayburn is a great figure in American history. There's no good biography of Sam Rayburn. Yet he controlled, he ran the House of Representatives. He passed so many of Roosevelt's bills and other bills. He did so much for America that it's a tragedy for me that nobody knows it. And the material to know it is in those cabinets, okay? And there's a lot, there happened to be a lot of examples of things. I said, well, that didn't make your stuff into the books, but they're there. Like I have hundreds of interviews, you know. I think I have 700 interviews to the power broker alone. The notes for those interviews are in the file canvas, detailed, you know, the detailed typed up notes.

So the material there, there's a lot there that I think would help people understand how New York evolved the way it did. And with Johnson, a lot, well, I'm writing about it now, things that happened under his presidency. There's more understanding of it, and it's not going to make its way into my books. but they're going to be there that's why I gave my archive to the New York Historical Society now I have to say I was offered a lot more money by other places okay I took a lot less money a great deal less money an amount that mattered a lot to me because I wanted them to be easily accessible I wanted them to be in New York I didn't want him to be at the University of Texas

where you have to fly down there I wanted to be in New York the material is there for a lot of stuff that I never got to put in my books but it's there if somebody wants it I'll give you an example I wrote so much more and I interviewed so many senators, so many assistants to senators to try and write about the Senate, and then I had to cut out or not write and even go into the vast, I don't want to say 90%, but I don't really know a percent, of what I learned is not in the books, but they are in the file cabinets. so they are there for someone to look at that's why my archives are in New York it's great to know that research will pay dividends through many generations of scholars because obviously it will not be possible to interview

the folks you interviewed in the 70s and 80s and 60s again this makes me wonder in order to paint a picture of the era that you're writing about and the eras that shaped Moses and Johnson. You talk about, in The Power Broker, the Gold Coast in New York and the tenements and the Johnson biographies. You talk about what the Hill Country was like when the frontier was being settled. Yes. And one thing that's interesting is that even if Johnson had not become president, it would still be fascinating, the story of what was happening in the Hill Country. And so, you know, it's an odd thought, But it makes me wonder if you could spend 10 years or 20 years writing the biography of a totally ordinary person, because in doing so, you'd still, a lot of what was true about Johnson would have still been fascinating, even if his career didn't end up where it did. Well, the example that you give, what was the Hill Country like?

You know, we see all these Western movies and all. But when I started to learn about the people who settled Johnson City, Lyndon Johnson's ancestors, but only the generation before him, or most two generations before him, you say, God, is this fascinating? what it was like what was it like I mean I wanted to do this book what was it like to take your family and move them to the frontier to move them on one level to Indian country where you might find your family massacred one day and if even all these other difficulties and all Well, that's sort of in my books, in my notes, because when I was talking to people, they would talk about their grandfathers or what their grandfathers told them.

And when I'm talking to them about Johnson, I'm learning all about what life was like in that era. What an amazing, amazing story this is. and you say, well, there's a lot of books on her. I happen to think there's not enough. What's also so amazing is just how different of a country. You think about Johnson growing up in Johnson City in this tiny little lonely town and even then being on a ranch that is tens of miles away from the city versus America in the 60s. It's such a different place. And I wonder if Johnson ever felt some shock of how different his upbringing was from the country he was leading. Oh, the answer is yes. He was very aware of the frontier of what his grandfather, you know, the land, what it was like.

See, when he grew up in Johnson City, in the outskirts on the Johnson Ranch, which after all was 18 miles beyond Johnson City, what it was like to grow up on a ranch like that. In so many ways, it was different than it formed your character in a different way. Loneliness is a big deal. I wrote a section, and then I had to cut it down to like three pages, on his mother and how lonely she was, what it was like for people to settle their farms and ranches where there was nobody around you. I think I have a line where, you know, she could walk out in the afternoon, walk up on a hill, and there was nothing to see but more hills. and there were no other houses near that. I myself was shocked.

Sometimes you would go to see, to interview, I was trying to interview everybody who grew up with Lyndon Johnson, so they were elderly people, okay? So you'd call an elderly woman, and she'd say, you drive out of Austin 22 miles and you'll come to a look on your left, you'll find a cattle guard. You turn and there's a dirt road there. You turn left on the dirt road and 22 miles to Marth Farm. And you say, I drove 22 miles. I didn't pass another house. I didn't pass another person. And this woman is living there all her life. So I don't think, and with all the wonderful books that have been written, I'm not sure that America understands the heroism of just being lonely,

forgetting Indians and raised, just being the loneliness of what life was like for these people. So I want to close on that, on loneliness, because obviously you're not living in a ranch in the middle of nowhere. You're living in New York City. But you and Ina have together basically been working alone for so long. How has loneliness affected your work and also your life? Oh, great question. Well, a lot. Let me think how I can say this. Well, you know, I come here in the morning. I turn off my telephone.

I'm not going to talk to anybody all day. I'm a friendly guy. Sometimes that very fact is hard, as a matter of fact, you know. You'd like to pick up the phone and chat with somebody, but you say, I'm concentrating on the book, you know, I can't do that. It's going to break the concentration, you know. Well, that sounds like such a phony thing. But you say, I can't really do that. I'm trying to think about this other thing. And I think, you know, it's impacted my entire life, you know. People don't, some people understand. but some people don't understand that you don't call them back.

You know, I mean, if people call me, I'm not going to call them back till the end of the day. So I have friends who understand that, but a lot of people don't understand that. So that's a fact of my life. Robert Jarrell, I can't tell you how much of an honor it's been. For six years that I've had this podcast, people will ask me, you know, who is the person you most want to have on that you haven't had on the podcast? And every single time I've said Robert Carroll. And so it's a huge, huge honor. Thank you so much for doing this. It was a terrific interview. Thank you very much.

番組の概要欄(原文)

The Robert Caro interview. Watch on YouTube; read the transcript. Sponsors * Antithesis lets you run thorough simulation tests on every PR your coding agents ship. That’s because Antithesis is FAST. On a recent project, it packed fifteen hours of simulation into each fifteen-minute run: every change could be tested in thousands of hostile worlds before being merged. Every minute your software spends in Antithesis is one of the unluckiest hours it will ever experience. Learn more at antithesis.com/dwarkesh * WorkOS’s Airlock is a judgment layer that sits between your agents and your most important tools. When an agent makes a request, Airlock evaluates it against your company’s policies and decides whether to allow it, block it, or escalate it to a human. If it allows it, Airlock takes action on behalf of the agent, which means your agents never see your API keys or other credentials. Airlock is in early access. If you’re interested, go to workos.com/airlock * Jane Street’s mystery ASIC puzzle is over, and they’ve published a blog post that reveals the chip’s purpose. You can read it here: blog.janestreet.com/asic-puzzle-results/. More importantly, there’s another challenge live now! For this one, you have to design a protocol-emulator ASIC that can be used to test chips outside of a live system. Jane Street will pay to fabricate their favorite submissions. The competition is open until January 18th. Get started at janestreet.com/dwarkesh Timestamps (00:00:00) – How Caro gets people to talk (00:05:03) – Does America need a little more Moses today? (00:12:42) – Moses the young idealist (00:17:57) – Watching Moses lose power (00:24:01) – Did Moses realize he was changing? (00:27:53) – Building during the Great Depression (00:32:51) – The threats and promises of Lyndon Johnson (00:36:08) – Could Kennedy have passed Johnson’s laws? (00:41:00) – Getting a book down to one sentence (00:46:21) – All the material that never made it into the books (00:52:59) – Loneliness This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit www.dwarkesh.com

出典・この記事について

番組
Dwarkesh Podcast(Dwarkesh Patel)
元の回
Robert Caro – The master biographer reflects at 91
配信日
要約作成日
公式サイト
www.dwarkesh.com/podcast

この要約・解説記事は、元の音声を文字起こしした内容をもとに AI(Claude)が日本語で作成したものです。 固有名詞や数値に誤りを含む場合があるため、正確な内容は元の音声でご確認ください。制作方法について

X でシェアSpotify で聴くApple Podcasts で聴く

関連エピソード